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1 Introduction
Token sales (TSs) have emerged as a new way of raising
capital on a peer-to-peer basis enabled by blockchain
technology. In TSs, an issuing entity sells proprietary
cryptographic tokens to finance further project development – often a blockchain-based platform or application
(Catalini and Gans 2018). Since the first TS in 2013, the
number of TSs and the amount of funding collected has
increased rapidly. In 2017, 552 TSs were completed to
collect a total amount of more than USD 7 billion, an
average of USD 12.75 million per TS. By January 2019,
the all-time funding volume of TSs exceeded USD 23
billion, of which EOS, an operating system for decentralized applications (dApps), collected USD 4.1 billion and
the messenger app Telegram collected USD 1.7 billion
(PWC 2019; Coindesk 2019; ICObench 2019). The new
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phenomenon of selling cryptographic tokens on the
blockchain is also known as a token generation event,
token launch, security token offering (STO) or most
prominently initial coin offering (ICO). ICOs have come to
be associated chiefly with the issuance of utility tokens,
while STOs describe a more mature and regulated form of
TS in which security tokens are issued. In the following,
we use the neutral term token sale as it is not linked to any
specific token type.
In a TS, the issuing entity generates cryptographic
tokens which can be bought by investors. The change of
ownership is registered on the blockchain, a distributed
ledger that allows for decentralized and immutable transaction recording (Beck et al. 2017; Notheisen et al. 2017).
New transactions, grouped in blocks, are only added to the
blockchain after so-called miners have verified their
legitimacy using a consensus mechanism. In the most
common consensus mechanism, called proof-of-work,
miners compete to solve a hash function (e.g., SHA-256) to
approve a block of transactions for which they get remunerated. Once a miner has found the correct solution to the
non-invertible hash function and the majority of network
participants agrees with the proposed solution, the block
can be added to the chain. Beyond ‘‘maintaining a coherent
set of facts between multiple participating nodes’’ (Swanson 2015, p. 4), consensus mechanisms also secure the
distributed ledger from attacks and prevent double spending of cryptographic assets.
Smart contracts play a central role in the implementation
and execution of a TS. A smart contract is source code
stored on the blockchain. It defines a set of rules for the
interaction of two or more parties. The terms defined in a
smart contract are automatically executed if the prespecified conditions are met. In the case of a TS, these rules
concern settings such as token price or sale duration. Most
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as a novel type of peer-to-peer crowdfunding enabled by
blockchain technology.
Token sales differ from traditional crowdfunding and
other forms of entrepreneurial financing, such as business
angel or venture capital investments, in several important
ways. For investors, TSs are associated with higher asset
liquidity, since tokens can usually be traded on crypto
exchanges after a TS. Additionally, rights can be associated
with the token, ranging from access to or discounts for
services and products to profit or voting rights. However,
established trust-building intermediaries are largely absent
and high information asymmetries complicate due diligence, a situation that has been exploited by several
fraudulent TSs (Kaal and Dell’Erba 2017; Amsden and
Schweizer 2018). For issuers, TSs offer a relatively easy
and fast way to raise capital, to economize on fees otherwise charged by intermediaries, and to unilaterally specify
investment terms. However, economic and regulatory
uncertainties and rising marketing and consulting costs are
increasingly exacerbating the execution of TSs (Amsden
and Schweizer 2018).

TSs have built upon the Ethereum blockchain protocol
(Buterin 2014). In contrast to the Bitcoin blockchain,
Ethereum enables (quasi) Turing complete smart contracts.
Issuers use smart contracts to generate (a process also
called minting) and allot tokens with a set of customized
properties. Once the TS goes live, the smart contract is
activated and can receive funds from investors, mostly in
the form of cryptocurrencies such as bitcoin or ether. Upon
reception of these funds, smart contracts issue a corresponding number of tokens to the investor and transfer the
received funds to the issuer’s wallet. These transactions are
verified by miners and stored on a blockchain. After a TS,
the tokens can be listed on crypto exchanges such as Bittrex, Poloniex, or Kraken to be traded by token holders.
Figure 1 illustrates the ecosystem of a TS.
Blockchain technology’s decentralized, immutable, and
transparent nature allows TSs to cut out many of the
intermediaries present in traditional venture financing, such
as banks, venture capital firms, or payment providers (Haas
et al. 2015). Owing to low investment barriers and an aim
to attract a large number of investors, TSs can be regarded
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In academia, TSs have recently attracted considerable
attention from various disciplines such as computer science
(e.g. Fenu et al. 2018; Hartmann et al. 2018), economics
(e.g. Catalini and Gans 2018; Conley 2017), and law (e.g.
Barsan 2017; Robinson 2017). The information systems
(IS) community has also shown increasing interest in the
phenomenon, e.g., by providing a taxonomy of ICOs
(Fridgen et al. 2018), a market engineering framework
(Notheisen et al. 2017), or a market analysis model (Jin
et al. 2017). As TSs are an interdisciplinary phenomenon
that raises a multitude of technological, economic, social,
and regulatory questions, there are abundant research
opportunities for various streams in IS research. To lay the
foundation for future research, we aim at providing insights
into TSs’ market design and technological implementation,
with a goal of showing how the IS community can contribute to the rapidly growing research on TSs.

2 Market Design and Technological Implementation
of TSs
A TS can be clustered into three main stages (see Fig. 2)
based on the most important and common activities. We
concentrate on TSs’ market design and technological
implementation and less on issuers’ internal processes such
as stipulating legal or vesting structures. Because of the
rapidly changing TS environment, it should be noted that
the activities and their timing vary considerably between
TSs. Our focus is on the most typical TS configurations. In
lieu of traditional intermediaries, a myriad of technology
artifacts connects different stakeholders and is thus used to
enable and support TSs.

2.1 Pre-TS Activities
In the pre-TS stage, issuers select a market design from
various options and determine a token model that should
align with the issuers’ business model and strategy and
with investors’ interests. First, issuers determine a token
type. There are four main types. Donation tokens are not
linked to any rights or claims for a future product or service
and are used to gather funds for idealistic entrepreneurial
ideas or causes. Currency tokens serve as virtual currencies
on the issuers’ blockchain protocol and can be used to pay
for products or services. They are often used when TS
issuers set up a new blockchain protocol. Utility tokens
serve as ‘‘digital coupons’’ which can be redeemed for
issuers’ offerings or to gain access to a platform or application. In 2017 and 2018, most TSs issued utility tokens
because of regulatory considerations and product popularization (Pietrewicz 2017; Adhami et al. 2017). Finally,
security tokens are tokens that give investors rights to a
pro-rata share of future profits, e.g., dividend or revenue
share. A subcategory of security tokens are equity tokens,
which additionally provide control or voting rights. Due to
their resemblance to securities, for which strict regulatory
rules exist, security tokens have been the most disputed
token type from a regulatory perspective (SEC 2017; BaFin
2018). However, financial market authorities across the
globe are modifying their regulations to accommodate TSs.
For instance, the German regulator BaFin has recently
approved the first security TS of a FinTech start-up.
Second, in the majority of TSs, issuers set caps on the
maximum supply of tokens that can be generated in a TS
and specify the value of a token (see Fig. 3). Some TSs do
not limit the supply of tokens, which allows issuers to raise
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an unlimited amount of funding. However, token oversupply can have negative implications for token valuation
and issuer reputation. In capped TSs, issuers determine a
lower and/or upper limit of funding. In the case of a lower
limit, a so-called soft cap, the invested funds are paid back
to investors if the defined soft cap is not reached. A hard
cap defines the maximum amount of funding an issuer
seeks to raise. Once this limit is reached, no more investments are accepted by the smart contract. A variant of the
hard cap model is ‘‘collect and return’’, in which a hard cap
exists, but additional investments beyond the hard cap are
accepted by the smart contract. In this case, after the TS,
the tokens are distributed to investors by the ratio of the
hard cap to the total received funds. Excess funding is
redistributed to investors accordingly. To ensure a broad
token distribution, issuers can use a ‘‘dynamic ceiling’’
model in which the hard cap is divided into multiple
(hidden) mid caps. In this way, the TS proceeds into
multiple, isolated rounds to avoid dominance of major
investors. Another market design option for issuers to
remain key token holder is to limit the circulating supply of
tokens by holding back a certain share of tokens.
Third, issuers set the pricing model. In case of capped
token sales, fixed prices may be set either arbitrarily by the
token issuing entity or, less commonly, a floating price is
determined by an auctioning model. In Dutch auctions, the
issuing entity allocates its tokens to the highest bidders and
the token is charged at the lowest accepted bid’s price. In a
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reverse Dutch auction, only a specified share of overall
tokens is offered per day and the price per token declines
with every day that the TS is active, until the defined
funding goal is reached.
Fourth, another market design option important for TSs
is the schedule of token sales. Many issuers run one or
multiple rounds of exclusive TS pre-sales before opening
the TS to the public in a main sale. In pre-sales, selected
investors have the opportunity to buy tokens at significantly lower prices than in the main sale. Pre-sales allow
issuers to attract renowned key investors, explore demand,
create attention for the main sale, and test and finance the
main sale. A disadvantage is that pre-investors have an
incentive to sell discounted tokens at regular prices as soon
as the main sale launches or the token becomes tradable,
respectively. Token issuing entities may therefore impose
one or multiple lock-up period(s) in which newly acquired
tokens must not be traded. It can be observed that an
increasing number of TSs refrains from main sales due to
the lower regulatory requirements pre-sales are subjected
to. For instance, the messaging service Telegram canceled
its main sale after achieving the funding goal in two rounds
of private sales. In pre-sales, investors are granted rights to
the future token through a Simple Agreement for Future
Tokens (SAFT, see www.saftproject.com).
Once issuers finalize these design options, the issuing
entity develops a smart contract which administers funds
and tokens during the TS. It is programmed to receive
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cryptocurrencies from investors, to send them to the digital
wallets of the issuing entity, and to transfer the equivalent
number of tokens to investors. The tokens typically follow
Ethereum’s ERC-20 token standard (Vogelsteller and
Buterin 2015) which allows developers to create customized and standardized tokens with relative ease. ERC
stands for ‘Ethereum Request for Comments’, the command protocol of the Ethereum blockchain, which runs on
the java-script-based programming language Solidity. The
ERC-20 token standard includes all specifications required
for a TS and ensures that tokens will be compatible with
generic third-party transaction services and applications.
The issuer can specify the TS by setting parameters, such
as total token supply, burning rules, funding goal and
duration, freezing options, and token value bound to a
cryptocurrency like bitcoin or ether. Based on this information, the token price and transaction fee for miners –
referred to as gas on the Ethereum blockchain – are calculated. Newer token standards, such as ERC-223 and
ERC-777, aim at addressing shortcomings of ERC-20, by
automatically canceling invalid transfers or offering
improved handling mechanisms.
After determining the token design, TS issuers generally
publish information about the token design, business
model, technological solution, and the venture’s roadmap
in a whitepaper. Issuers distribute these whitepapers using
their own website and social media platforms such as
Reddit, Bitcoin Talk, or Cryptocointalk. In the absence of
auditing intermediaries and content regulation, whitepapers
are crucial for overcoming the substantial information
asymmetries between issuers and investors. Given the high
regulatory uncertainty involved in TSs, whitepapers provide information on the token sales’ terms and conditions,
which specify the issuing party and its place of business,
timing and pricing of the token sale, use of the raised funds,
and other rights and obligations associated with the token.
Whitepapers also explain how to pay for the issuers’ token,
detailing a TS’s smart contract address and a recommended
gas limit. Therefore, whitepapers are a main source for
investors’ due diligence.
To allow investors to assess issuers’ technological
solution and the status quo of its implementation during the
pre-TS stage, many issuers partly or fully publish their
prototype’s source code on a web-based hosting service
(e.g., GitHub), often in an alpha or beta version. Some
issuers additionally offer bounties for code auditing and
bug detection in the TS’s smart contract. A further
important source of information is the blockchain community’s sentiment, as articulated on social media (e.g.,
Reddit, Slack, Telegram, Facebook, Twitter). Issuers also
use these channels for direct and indirect communication
with the community and potential investors. To increase
community interest and support, issuers frequently use so-

749

called ‘‘airdrops’’ and ‘‘bounty programs’’ which offer
token-based rewards for performing social media campaigns like Twitter posts using the TS’s hashtag, blog
posts, or other promotional activities for the TS. TS-related
websites (e.g., Coindesk) are another important resource
for investors, as they offer ratings, news, and schedules on
forthcoming TSs.
2.2 Activities During a TS
The actual TS starts with the activation of the smart contract. On average, TSs last 41 days (Kostovetsky and
Benedetti 2018), during which issuers are in charge of
marketing, investor relations and support. Before investors
can send money to the smart contract, an increasing
number of TS issuers requires investors to register themselves (‘‘whitelisting’’) before they can participate in the
token sale. Whitelisting effectuates Know-Your-Customer
(KYC) and Anti-Money-Laundering (AML) policies and
thus protects issuers from regulatory scrutiny and blocks
illegal investors who use TSs for money laundering or
‘‘pump and dump’’ behaviors.
In the actual TS, investors send funds, usually cryptocurrencies such as bitcoin or ether, to the smart contract,
which transfers the currency units to the digital wallets of
the issuing entity. These wallets do not actually store the
currency units (this is done on the blockchain), but they
store one or more public and private keys which are needed
to send and receive cryptocurrencies. A wallet’s data file
contains the private key, a 256-bit number which is only
known to the owner, and a corresponding public key which
is needed to prove ownership of cryptocurrencies and to
facilitate transactions.
To ensure a safe transfer and storage of funds, an
errorless smart contract is crucial. In addition, the security
and stability of wallets and information regarding the TS
are issuers’ top priorities, as hackers can use vulnerabilities
to compromise the TS. For instance, the CoinDash TS lost
an estimated USD 7 million in investments after cyberattackers manipulated the smart contract address posted on
the issuer’s website. Thus, security precautions include
professional audits of wallet and website code, smart
contract verification, and two-factor authentication. As
wallets are a main target of hackers, issuers use multisignature wallets, which require more than one private key
for authentication and special hardware for a secure deposit
of private keys to prevent the invested funds from theft.
2.3 Post-TS Activities
In the post-TS stage, the smart contract transfers tokens to
investors’ wallets. Unsold tokens are mostly ‘‘burned’’ to
decrease the number of tokens in circulation and to
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increase token valuation. Further, token burning ensures
that the distribution of tokens between investors, issuers,
and other entities remains as communicated in the
whitepaper. A key advantage for TS investors compared to
conventional venture investments is the high liquidity of
tokens. To facilitate an easy exchange of tokens, the token
should be listed on crypto asset exchanges. However,
getting listed on top-tier exchanges is difficult as exchange
operators focus on tokens with high trading volumes and
often charge considerable amounts for a listing. To get
listed, the token should also follow a common standard,
like Ethereum’s ERC-20 token format, which allows easy
integration on exchanges. However, even if a token gets
listed on an exchange, it may get delisted at a later point
due to low trading volumes, technical issues, or suspicions
of fraud.
Based on the received funds and the investor network
established through the TS, issuers further develop the
product or service, and integrate the token in their offering.
To fund these efforts, the issuer may liquidate some of the
received funding into fiat currencies. Similar to traditional
investor relations, token holder and community management continues to be a key priority for issuers to keep
investors informed and well-disposed so as to increase user
and token demand. Although rare, issuers may also perform
subsequent token sales after the TS to raise more money.

3 Conclusion and Research Opportunities
Our goal was to delineate how TSs are designed from an
economic and technological perspective and which activities and transactions among heterogeneous actors occur
using different technology artifacts. Because of blockchain
technology’s decentralized nature, TSs provide a largely
disintermediated funding mechanism that could diminish
barriers inherent to traditional venture financing and other
types of investment. Many regard TSs as a democratization
of venture funding and advancement of crowdfunding,
since investors can participate in projects with little means
and supervision (Rohr and Wright 2017). Equally, issuers
can collect capital without giving away equity and at relatively low costs (Conley 2017). However, the disintermediated nature and technological novelty of TSs pose
various challenges for issuers, investors, and regulators
alike (Kostovetsky and Benedetti 2018). In light of an array
of fraudulent TSs, regulatory authorities struggle to find a
balance between guarding against risks and empowering
innovation (Lagarde 2018).
As TSs are still in their infancy and their patterns change
rapidly, it would be premature to conclude that TSs will
disrupt venture financing. At the same time, it is reasonable
to predict that TSs and blockchain technology in general

123

will have a significant influence on the way venture
financing currently works, even it may not completely
disrupt it. As such, it can be concluded that the underlying
mechanisms and technologies of TSs provide new opportunities to enable peer-to-peer investments in digital and
physical assets, a process called tokenization, which are
transparently and securely registered on the blockchain.
Thus, TSs could provide the foundation for decentralized
investments and a token economy which has the potential
to redefine established processes of funding and platform
management, enabling new token-based business models
and governance structures. A common misconception
about TS is that it is a new funding mechanism only for
start-ups based on blockchain technology. What is evident
from our analysis of TSs is that it is a complex web of
heterogeneous actors who perform a series of social and
technical activities, mobilizing a heterogeneous set of
technological artifacts, including but not limited to blockchain. The use of the plethora of technologies by heterogeneous actors in TSs offers an exciting context for many
research opportunities in IS. The design of TSs is not just a
technical exercise, nor merely an economic one. It is a
unique blend of techno-economic design, where new economic logics of peer-to-peer venture funding models are
technically implemented through a web of heterogeneous
technologies.
Given the boundary-spanning nature of TSs and blockchain technology in general (Beck et al. 2017), the IS
community is well positioned to critically investigate this
emerging phenomenon from technical, behavioral, sociotechnical, or regulatory perspectives using different
methodological approaches and theoretical foundations.
We believe that TSs’ idiosyncratic technological and economic characteristics require research between the two
opposite poles of techno-skepticism and blockchain
enthusiasm to thoroughly understand TSs’ positive and
negative implications for different stakeholders. In so
doing, we can also examine the role of different technology
artifacts and their material agencies in shaping the consequences of TSs.
In this spirit, we suggest avenues for future research on
TSs building upon dimensions suggested by Risius and
Spohrer (2017) and Aral et al. (2013), as summarized in
Table 1. The identified research questions touch upon the
implications of TSs for ‘private and institutional investors’,
‘society’, ‘intermediaries’, ‘technology artifacts’, and
‘firms and industries’. For each level of analysis, we propose research questions related to the activities design and
features, measurement and value, management and organization, and regulations and legal. It should be noted that
a multitude of interesting boundary-spanning research
questions emerge at the interface of the different levels of
analysis and activities depicted in Table 1. While by no
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Table 1 Multidisciplinary research framework on token sales with example research questions
Design and features

Measurement and value

Management and
organization

Regulations and legal

Level of analysis

How TSs are designed (e.g.,
token specifications, pricing,
blockchain protocol) and the
differential effects of TS
design and features

Added value that TSs provide on
the different levels and how it can
be appropriated

Governance of TSs and the
strategies and tactics
employed by actors in TSs

Policies and legal
regulations that (inter-)
national policy makers
enact regarding TSs

Private and institutional
investors, society

How can affordances such as
traceability, consensus
mechanisms, potential
deanonymization, or
decentralization affect TS
adoption?

Which factors drive TS success?
What is the role of the TS
teams’ human and social
capital?

How does token-based
governance impact
venture success?

How can investor
protection be
strengthened in a
distributed computing
environment with trusted
intermediaries largely
absent?

Actors who invest in TSs and the
societal consequences of TSs

How do TS design features
impact TS investment
decisions and TS success?
Which TS design features
reduce uncertainty and
increase venture quality?
How do TS design features
impact token value and
valuation over time?

How can TS risk be assessed to
construct optimal
portfolios? What is the
relationship between traditional
asset classes and crypto tokens?
What are the determinants of
token liquidity and how
does liquidity affect post-TS
returns?
What are the main drivers of TS
profitability in the long term?

How do pre-sale bonuses
affect token valuation in the
short, medium, and long
term?

Intermediaries
Intermediary service providers, as
well as applications and
processes that are hosted within
a blockchain environment
connecting a service provider
and a service consumer

How will decentralized
token-based voting and
control rights affect
decision outcomes in
organizations?
Which hybrid startup
financing models (e.g.,
VC and TS) will be most
attractive for investors?

How can fraudulent TSs be
identified?
How should tokens be
treated by financial
service authorities (e.g.,
security or asset)?
Which disclosure
obligations should be
imposed on TS issuers
and investors?
How effective is the Simple
Agreement for Future
Tokens (SAFT) for
protecting investor
rights?

How can intermediaries
enable token exchange across
different blockchain
protocols?

Which intermediary roles and
responsibilities are most likely to
emerge? What is their added
value?

How can smart contracts be
designed to be integrated
with existing information
systems?

How can intermediaries increase
the level of trust in smart
contracts’ algorithms?

How can intermediaries help
investors evaluate TS design
features?

What is the motivation of
private and institutional
investors to participate in
TSs?

Will re-intermediation lead to an
increase or decrease of the
number and size of TSs?

How are activities that are
usually enacted by
intermediaries shared
between different TS
actors?
Will new intermediaries
emerge in the TS context
or will established
intermediaries (e.g.,
crowdfunding platforms,
VCs) diversify?

How can intermediaries
effectively protect and add
value for investors?
Does the removal of an
intermediary party cause
an in- or decrease in the
perceived empowerment
and control?
How can smart contracts be
audited by
intermediaries?

How will trustees and
escrow accounts affect
TSs and ventures’
governance?
Technology artifacts
Different blockchain
implementations and networks
(e.g., Ethereum, Hyperledger),
various types of blockchains
(e.g., levels of permission), crosssystem interactions (e.g.,
integrating blockchain protocols
with each other or into
established systems), and social
media and networking tools

How can public and private
blockchains be designed and
integrated to address security
and scalability issues?

Which factors determine issuers’
selection of a blockchain protocol
(e.g., new or established, levels
of permission)?

How can scalability problems
be solved (e.g., novel
consensus mechanisms, offchain transactions)?

What is the effect of the used
blockchain protocol for TS
success?

How to establish smart
contracts’ interoperability
across multiple
blockchains?
How to establish token
tradability across
blockchains?
How do TS features impact
the usage of social media
and networking tools?
What is the impact of TS
design on affordance
actualization of social media
and networking tools?

How does the number of TSs on a
blockchain protocol affect its
valuation?
How do the valuations of native
and on-chain tokens correlate?
What is the inherent value of
social media and networking
tools in TSs? Do they impact
TS success?

How does blockchain
protocols’ interoperability
affect TS adoption?
How can the assessment of
smart contracts and
blockchain-enabled
transactions be simplified?
What is the impact of
blockchain protocol’s
ownership on TSs’
success?
Which impact do consensus
mechanisms have on the
procedure and outcome of
TSs?
What is the role of social
media and networking
tools on token issuers’
trustworthiness? How do
they impact investment
decisions?

How can smart contracts
become a widely accepted
form of investment
agreement?
How can unlawful
transactions be
identified?
How should regulators treat
native tokens compared
to on-chain tokens?
To which degree should
regulatory bodies set
boundaries on possible
token designs?
How should regulators treat
tokens that are associated
with physical assets?
How can social media and
networking tools help to
protect investors from
fraud?
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Table 1 continued

Firms and industries
Organizations and industries that
are prone to be affected by TSs
or perform TSs themselves

Design and features

Measurement and value

Management and
organization

Regulations and legal

How can public and private
blockchains be integrated to
satisfy requirements (e.g.,
compliance, security,
scalability) of financial
institutions?

Which other use cases exist for
peer-to-peer investments on the
blockchain (tokenization)?

What impact will TSs have
on startup and corporate
financing (e.g. venture
capital firms, private
equity)?

How can transaction
traceability be used to
avoid tax fraud?

How can sensitive data (e.g.,
investors, financial records)
be concealed on
permissionless blockchains?
How can the trade-off
between transparency and
privacy be solved from a
technical perspective?

What will the role of established
financial institutions be in the
TS environment? Which new
capabilities are needed by
financial institutions to
participate?
How to design a token model that
aligns with the issuer’s
business model?
Are TS-funded ventures more
successful than traditionally
funded organizations?
Why do organizations perform
TSs instead of traditional forms
of fundraising (e.g.,
crowdfunding, VC)?

means exhausting, we hope that these example research
questions will stimulate the IS research community to lead
the discussion on TSs and provide guidance for all
stakeholders.
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